Published Date : 19/07/2025
The Canadian Patent Appeal Board (PAB) has made a significant ruling on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can be recognized as an inventor under Canadian patent law. In the case of Thaler, Stephen L. (Re), 2025 CACP 8, the PAB decided that Canadian Patent Application No. 3,137,161, which listed an AI system called DABUS as the sole inventor, did not meet the requirements for a patent to be granted.
Canadian Patent Application No. 3,137,161 is unique because it involves a fractal-based food container and a flashing emergency beacon, both claimed to be inventions of DABUS. DABUS, developed by Stephen Thaler, a computer scientist, has been at the forefront of challenging and expanding the legal definition of inventorship in various jurisdictions. Thaler has also pursued intellectual property protection for works generated by his machines, such as an artwork entitled “A Recent Entrance to Paradise” created by his “Creativity Machine.”
In 2018, Thaler filed for patent protection in multiple jurisdictions, naming DABUS as the sole inventor and himself as the inventor’s legal representative. This move aimed to challenge the legal definition of inventorship under patent law. However, courts and patent offices worldwide, including the United States, UK, European Patent Office, and Australia, have consistently rejected the idea that an AI system can be recognized as a named inventor.
The PAB, following the global trend, ruled that only humans can be inventors under Canadian patent law. In its decision, the PAB provided a comprehensive statutory interpretation of the term “inventor.” It began by assessing the grammatical and ordinary sense of the term, referencing well-known dictionaries that generally define “inventor” as a person rather than an AI system.
Thaler argued that the meaning of words can evolve over time, citing examples like “calculator” and “computer,” which once referred to humans but now typically refer to machines. However, the PAB rejected this argument, noting that there is no evidence that the term “inventor” shares the same scope.
The PAB also considered the context surrounding the term and found that other provisions in the Patent Act and Patent Rules imply that inventors must be natural persons. For instance, the term “patentee” implies that inventors must be persons, as they would become the patentee if they do not assign their rights to another party and a patent is granted.
The PAB further addressed the object and scheme of the Patent Act and parliamentary intention. While the courts have emphasized the importance of encouraging and recognizing advances in science and technology, the patent system has limits on what can fall within its purview. For example, a mouse produced by an innovative process cannot be patented, nor can a method of medical treatment. Similarly, the PAB concluded that the current guidance on openness to innovation does not justify redefining “inventor” to include AI systems.
Canadian case law also supports the PAB’s interpretation. The courts have consistently interpreted “inventor” as limited to natural persons and have not indicated any intention to include non-natural persons or entities like DABUS.
The PAB considered Thaler’s arguments regarding ownership, entitlement, and policy but found them insufficient to support the assertion that AI systems should hold inventorship. Ultimately, the PAB concluded that the 161 Application did not satisfy subsection 27(2) of the Patent Act and section 54 of the Patent Rules, which require a patent application to be filed by an inventor or the legal representative of an inventor, with the inventor identified and a statement of entitlement filed.
Thaler retains the right to appeal the PAB decision to the Federal Court, and based on precedents in other jurisdictions, he may pursue this matter further.
Even though “inventor” is not defined in the Patent Act or Patent Rules, the PAB emphasized that legal inventorship must be human. The question of whether a human can be credited with the required “inventive concept” when an AI system generates an invention without human input remains unresolved. This decision is a significant precedent in Canadian intellectual property law and reinforces the global consensus that AI cannot hold inventorship status under existing legal frameworks.
Q: What is the key issue in the Canadian Patent Appeal Board's ruling?
A: The key issue was whether an artificial intelligence (AI) system can be recognized as an inventor under Canadian patent law.
Q: What is the 161 Application and why is it significant?
A: The 161 Application is a patent application that listed an AI system called DABUS as the sole inventor. It is significant because it challenges the traditional definition of inventorship in patent law.
Q: How did courts and patent offices in other jurisdictions rule on AI inventorship?
A: Courts and patent offices in the United States, UK, European Patent Office, and Australia have consistently rejected the idea that an AI system can be recognized as a named inventor.
Q: What arguments did Stephen Thaler present to support AI as an inventor?
A: Thaler argued that the meaning of words can evolve over time, citing examples like 'calculator' and 'computer.' He also presented arguments regarding ownership, entitlement, and policy.
Q: What are the implications of the PAB's decision for future patent applications involving AI?
A: The PAB's decision reinforces the global consensus that AI cannot hold inventorship status under existing legal frameworks, which may influence future patent applications and legal interpretations.